The money at HET Symphony Orchestra has run out. Despite all the extra millions from the province and after years of writing off tons of general reserves, the end is in sight. And so the orchestra is cancelling concerts, will be seen less in theatres in Deventer and Zwolle, stops CD recordings and shuns any risky performances. To put the freed-up hours to good use, some members of the orchestra will perform in community centres, homes for the elderly and schools.
In fact, the orchestra thus acknowledges it can no longer meet its core objective imposed by the ministry: to offer a broad symphonic repertoire in the east of the country. And this at the very moment when the new subsidy application has to be submitted, at the very moment when a new provincial government is being formed that will have to decide on any additional funding for the orchestra.
It is a tragedy for the musicians of the orchestra, a tragedy for the eastern part of the country and a tragedy that should have been prevented.
How did it come to this? A reconstruction
October 2010: only visit counts.
When Halbe Zijlstra takes office as State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science in October 2010, there doesn't seem to be a problem yet. After all, VVD administrators on culture, you have little trouble with that, do not suddenly demand that all emphasis is placed on participation or education. But already in its first major interview with Vrij Nederland, Zijlstra set the tone: not the Culture Council or other experts should determine what constitutes good art, but the public. Visitor numbers should become a decisive criterion:
"Otherwise, a small group will decide which art should be subsidised. Art is for society. If society is not willing to go after it, something is fundamentally wrong."
Moments later, Zijlstra comes up with proposals to cut over 200 million from the culture budget. Symphony orchestras are also hit hard and the plan envisages mergers of orchestras in Overijssel and Gelderland, Brabant and Limburg.
May 2011: Orchestra goes into business
The then still Orkest van het Oosten reacted furiously in May 2011:
"Zijlstra's plan is ill-considered, too rigorous, too fast and leads to capital destruction. Merging means talking instead of doing, and quantity instead of quality."
At the same time, it provides the blueprint for the future:
"The Orchestra of the East has been proving for several years that it is possible to attract more visitors with less subsidy. With the least subsidy per visitor, we are in the top 3 of Dutch orchestras. With a clear business plan, we are working now and in the future for more own income, less subsidy dependence, more activities, for more and more (different) visitors."
When the orchestra's subsidy is actually almost halved, the orchestra reacts decisively.
February 2012: Aurora!
To cope with the million-dollar cut, the orchestra first launches Opera Aurora, "an opera production house anchored in the eastern Netherlands" that not only aims to bring high-profile operas throughout the Netherlands, but above all "puts the audience first".
The rather messy and not well-substantiated application not only set bad blood with then Nationale Reisopera, also based in Enschede, but also caused resentment among local culture councillor, Marijke van Hees (PvdA), now a member of the Council for Culture. When the Culture Council decides negatively on the culture application, the orchestra and Reisopera bury the hatchet, and the orchestra looks for new ways to escape the imposed cuts.
March 2012: The world is not enough
A solution is found in buying out the annual provincial subsidy. A very ambitious new plan is launched, explicitly capitalising on Zijlstra's propagation of bringing in your own money to become less dependent on the subsidiser. It was the time of the Giving Act.
The orchestra reckons to be only half dependent on subsidy within five years. To achieve that goal, it wants five million immediately and another five million later. The province hesitates, but thanks to support from the CDA, which at that moment in the coalition in The Hague has to put up with a lot from its supporting partner PVV and sees that that party of all parties in Limburg is very generous in defending Limburg culture, the millions er. Despite warnings that the plan is too optimistic.
April 2012: International ambitions and court cases
With the provincial millions in its pocket, the orchestra is undoing the government's cuts, the merger with the Gelderland Orchestra has been avoided and it can continue on its chosen course. Although it has taken on a huge mortgage. Moreover, to fulfil its international ambitions and grow into the largest orchestra outside Amsterdam, it will have a new name: Netherlands Symphony Orchestra.
March 2014: And then came the first cracks.
The Netherlands Philharmonic is invoking previous agreements: several lawsuits and even proceedings on the merits follow. All are filed by the orchestra lost, first calling itself *****Orkest, eventually followed by its current name: THE Symphony Orchestra.
January 2015: the bike shed affair
Meanwhile, things are rumbling in the orchestra. More and more freelance work has to be done, the level is falling and irritation about expensive external advisers is the talk of the day. Moreover, despite frantic efforts, the search for major sponsors yields virtually nothing. However, the orchestra does launch new participation projects, presents an opera in Zwolle and Amsterdam, and borrows money from the municipality to turn a bicycle shed into a office space rebuild.
March 2015: No alarm bells ringing at municipality over failing supervision
Perhaps alarm bells should have been ringing at the municipality at the time. Why does the orchestra need money for a relatively simple refurbishment? Aren't there general reserves for that? And how is it possible that the Supervisory Board did not intervene? Not all the figures are readily available to the outside world, but a Supervisory Board has to intervene before things get so bad with an orchestra that there is actually little else left but to sit it out until perhaps new money arrives.
Reserves evaporated
A study of HET Symfonieorkest's annual figures shows that this 'bike shed loan' was indeed more than necessary, as the orchestra withdrew more than 2.5 tonnes from those general reserves in 2013. By comparison, the Noord Nederlands Orkest (NNO) added over a tonne to its reserves in that year. And the figures - also simply available to politicians - show more alarming.
More audience, but not more tickets sold
With similar budgets, similar problems, the surrounding NNO and Gelders Orkest realised over 35% more audience income. The attendance figures that the orchestra, prompted to do so by Zijlstra, likes to screen give a positive picture, but these figures can and should be questioned. At the end of 2013, the orchestra still did not manage to generate more than 17% of its own income.
Just to stay with the Noord Nederlands Orkest: that orchestra saw a drop in attendance numbers in the same year. Not bad, says Ingeborg Wallinga on Radio 4, because "easily explained by the fact that the NNO gave fewer open-air concerts and crossovers." Spectators alone won't save you, it's about paying visitors.
The future: from entrepreneurial to social orchestra?
HET Symfonieorkest has presented itself as the pre-eminent entrepreneurial orchestra since the Rutte I government took office. But in doing so, it used a tactic aimed primarily at reaching the widest possible audience. A concert tour to China? Of course! But all these activities do not necessarily generate money: quite the contrary, as the figures of recent years show.
The crisis is not to blame
The orchestra now flatly admits that generating additional income from all these activities has failed. But blaming that purely on the "impact and duration of the crisis" shows poor entrepreneurship. And downright shocking is the orchestra's solution: perform for free, because "not performing is a waste". However, in doing so, the orchestra immediately says: "We don't make enough money from this yet, but it does help us build local links and new projects emerge. The power of our music is strong and we can use it to show why investing in the orchestra is relevant. This is done throughout Overijssel with the aim of building as many contacts as possible in two years and gaining support for special projects in classical music."
Gaining support and money with the core business has not succeeded. It is an illusion that it will succeed with leaving the core business. At the same time, the orchestra is again asking for additional money:
"Even the highly successful education projects are under pressure if project funding is not found for them."
This conveniently conceals the fact that these highly successful education projects are also part of the orchestra's core mission. Without them, the orchestra would receive no subsidy from the state, province and municipality.
How next?
The orchestra is on the verge of bankruptcy and has rapidly lost all political goodwill. Tellingly, the CDA - the largest party in the province again after the last election - of all parties did not mention the orchestra in its election manifesto.
The previous business model, with which the orchestra tried to be the best boy in the Zijlstra class, did not work. The new plan, with which the management is then going to desperately respond to what may be Bussemaker's vision, is if anything even more hopeless. In fact, you can't even call it a business model. Well, the orchestra is throwing in the towel, but fiddles around for another year and a half because it still gets some subsidy.
[Tweet ""Huge risks, blatant opportunism, blind faith in market thinking""]The Culture Council will assess a new grant application even more critically than ever and will again propose a merger with the Gelderland Orchestra. Little criticism of the orchestra's policies can be expected from its board: both management and board consist of one and the same person. It is up to the Supervisory Board to intervene and save what can be saved, even if that results in a merger with another orchestra Although the Arnhem Philharmonic will already do everything possible to prevent that, especially with this management, this board and these supervisors.
Worryingly, HET Symphony Orchestra is not alone, although countless millions are involved. The policy introduced by Zijlstra has had an impact on numerous places led to the deliberate taking of huge risks, shameless opportunism, blind faith in market thinking and the over-inflation of bubbles. In the coming months, bubble after bubble will burst, after which the real havoc will become visible. But a mess as big as the one at the Enschede orchestra will hopefully prove to be unprecedented.